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Abstract
This paper investigates to what extent travellers change their route when faced with unex-
pected traﬃc situation. To this end, traﬃc data from days with serious incidents are analysed in
this contribution. The ﬂows retrieved from loop detectors on the routes past the incident and on
alternative routes are compared with the same values on days without an incident. It is found that
for major accidents up to 50% of the travellers deviate from their normal route if the traﬃc situa-
tion is diﬀerent. Furthermore, more travellers take an alternative route if the delay on the original
route is caused by an accident than if they are faced with the same delay on the original route
without an incident. These ﬁndings are for instance important for providing route information or
suggestions on alternative routes or for ﬁnding vulnerable links.
Keywords: Route choice, accidents, rerouting
1. Introduction
The traﬃc situation and the total traﬃc delay depend on the traﬃc supply and the traﬃc
demand. The demand inﬂuences the delay in two ways: not only because of the changing number
of travellers that queue to pass the bottleneck itself, but a long queue also can cause delays for
people travelling to destinations upstream of the bottleneck. If the queue grows longer than the
distance to the closest (upstream) oﬀramp, travellers which are not passing the incident location
are delayed.
In case of an evacuation, the outﬂow out of the hazardous area is the most important per-
formance. It would therefore be best to never have an underutilization of the exit links of the
evacuation area due to spillback. Knoop et al. [1] studied this situation and the beneﬁts of
rerouting in case of an evacuation. If evacuees choose the destination which is closest by and
they choose their routes based on normal travel times, much of the evacuation capacity of the
exit links is lost. In contrast, if there is control and people will change routes or destination, the
evacuation will take place at a rate almost equal to the sum of the capacities of the links out of
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the evacuation area. In case people just change their routes (and not their destination) the net-
work performs almost at maximum rate for the ﬁrst part of the evacuation, until a large part of
the travellers is already out of the network and the outﬂow links are unused caused by a lack of
demand. Knoop et al. [1] therefore concluded that if travellers take other routes than their usual
routes in evacuation conditions, delay caused by internal jams can be avoided.
That study used simulation and an assumed route choice. This article adds empirical results
an the actual rerouting behaviour of travellers in case of exceptional conditions. We concentrate
on the route choice after an accident as reference situation, rather than an evacuation for which
there are no much route choice data available. However, we believe that if travellers decide to
take an alternative route in case of a “ordinary” accident, they will certainly be willing to deviate
from their intended route if the traﬃc conditions diﬀer even more than that, like in case of an
evacuation.
We analyse the routes people choose when facing an incident situation on the road. We do
this by measuring traﬃc ﬂows and derive the route choice change. Other studies usually use
a simulator set-up or questionnaires which give the route choices made by a sample group of
travellers and sometimes even give stated preferences instead of revealed preferences. There is,
to the the best of our knowledge, currently no study in the literature describing the actual change
in route choice due to an incident by using the data of all vehicles, for instance measured by
traﬃc monitoring devices. This study ﬁlls that gap. The contribution of this paper is that we
ﬁnd that up to 50 % of the travellers change their route under exceptional conditions. It shows
furthermore that more people change their route if there is an accident on the intended route than
in case there is a queue of the same length without an accident. It even shows a hysteresis eﬀect:
the travellers’ reaction is delayed compared to the traﬃc situation.
In the next section, previous studies discussing route choice in incident conditions are brieﬂy
described, as well as the way these studies relate to work presented in this paper. It then continues
by explaining the methodology in-depth in section 3. That section also gives a description of the
type of data that has been used. Section 4 describes the ﬁve incident situations which have been
studied. The results, in terms of route choice, are given in section 5. That section also discusses
diﬀerences found between the ﬁve incidents, and discusses the generalisability towards other
events than accidents, such as evacuations. Section 6 concludes the contribution and states some
ideas of future research.
2. Previous route choice studies
Many articles describe the inﬂuence of information on for instance awareness of alternative
routes or the routes that are considered. Chorus et al. [2] provide an excellent overview of
diﬀerent studies carried out. We will refer to their article for a comprehensive overview. Here
the most important are listed, which are divided into two diﬀerent categories: studies describing
a theoretical framework and studies presenting data on drivers’ preference.
2.1. Theory
For our study, it is particularly important to which extent the travellers deviate from their in-
tended routes when facing unexpected queues. A sensitivity analysis of this deviation percentage
can be found in chapter 7 of the thesis of Li [3]. It states that for a optimal network performance,
there exists an optimal percentage of travellers that adapt their route en-route. Using simulation,
Li shows that the impact of the fraction of people changing routes is large.
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A theoretical explanation of what the inﬂuence of route information could be is given for
instance by De Palma and Picard [4]. Using a mathematical game-theoretical framework, they
show possible advantages of giving route information, assuming a certain compliance rate.
2.2. Practice
This section describes studies which describe the personal choice (stated or revealed in prac-
tice) of travellers.
2.2.1. Stated preference
Koo and Yim [5] study the behaviour of individual travellers in practice and analyse how they
adapt their behaviour to traﬃc information. The study is restricted to 1052 participants that have
ﬁlled out a questionnaire on their behaviour and it is limited to one speciﬁc type of incidents,
namely the larger incidents giving a delay of more than 30 minutes, but not completely blocking
the motorway. They ﬁnd that even if travellers are informed about the traﬃc situation, 70%
of them still keep stick to their original plan of departure time and route choice. A similar
methodology with a questionnaire is applied by Jou et al. [6]. Amongst others, they conclude
that while the travel times are within a certain band width, the travellers do not change their
routes.
Some studies describe how people choose their route and how Advanced Traveller Informa-
tion Services (ATIS) inﬂuences them using a simulated route choice environment, [7, 8]. Bogers
et al. [8] discuss how people weight the inﬂuence of on-line information compared to their previ-
ous experiences. The authors conclude that people learn from bad experiences and that travellers
only rely on correct information. That is, as soon as they ﬁnd out that the information is incorrect,
their reaction is not always in line with the provided information.
2.2.2. Revealed preference
Muller et al. [9] discuss the type of data that can be used to measure traﬃc data in congested
network. One of the examples shown is how loop detector data can show what alternative route
people take when an incident has happened, which the type of information which is needed for
the analyses in the current paper.
Kraan et al. [10] show the inﬂuence of Variable Message Signs showing the queue length.
They ﬁnd that “each additional kilometer queue length displayed leads to a reduction of the
proportion of drivers that select that route between 0.8 and 1.6 percent.” These are percentages of
the total ﬂow which possibly consist of travellers which have a destination upstream of the point
where the two alternative routes come together. Therefore, the fraction of travellers changing
their route might be larger then this 0.8% to 1.6% percent, conclude the authors. Their ﬁndings
are based on the (stochastic) change of recurrent congestion. They do not study the route choice
changes in incident situations in particular. Whether queues caused by incidents have a diﬀerent
eﬀect will be studied in this contribution.
The study presented here is inspired by ﬁndings of Kraaijeveld [11] who uses detector data
and an incident database. He analyses ﬁve cases, in which he ﬁnds one case in which travellers
deviate signiﬁcantly. His conclusion is that, for the speciﬁc situation considered, a serious inci-
dent makes around 7% of the drivers deviate, whereas in the other cases the disruption was too
small to cause a change. The ﬁnal conclusion is based on one observation on one day, and the
statistical variations in the normal route choice are not given.
This contribution also studies revealed preference in real-life, like Kraan [10] and Kraaijeveld
[11]. Rather than Kraan, we study the situations with an incident. We use a similar methodology,
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Table 1: The alternative routes
Alternative I II III
Exit at A C1 C2
Extra free ﬂow time 9 min 2 min 4 min
Extra distance 6 km 5 km 7 km
Distance on non-motorway 4 km 7 km 3 km
but a larger set of incidents. Furthermore, we choose another location where is it possible to
analyse the ﬂows in more detail.
3. Methodology and data selection
This section discusses how the route choice change is determined and how the incidents are
selected that are used in this study.
3.1. Possible alternative routes
The motorway A13, east of the town of Delft in the Netherlands (ﬁgure 1a), is the main
corridor for traﬃc with an origin in The Hague or more north to Rotterdam and other destinations
more south. We consider the network of the A13 motorway and its alternative (highway) routes.
In the study we will focus on traﬃc from “O” to “D” or vice versa. To get from “O ”to “D”, one
has to pass the motorway junction indicated with a “B” in ﬁgure 1a. The quickest route between
these motorway junctions next to the letters “O” and “B” in ﬁgure 1a is along the A13. This trip
is 24 kilometers long and would take 17 minutes in free ﬂow.
In a database of incidents we looked for incidents on the A13 near Delft. This location is
particularly interesting because it provides two alternative routes that can be followed, depending
on incident severity and incident location.
The remainder of this section describes the alternative routes. There are two routes, one with
a large overlap with the old route and one with a small overlap. Some properties can be found in
table 1. Alternative route I is described for traﬃc from “O” to “D”, whereas the alternative routes
II and III are described for traﬃc from “D” to “O”. This is because for the considered accidents
(see section 4), these turn out to be the relevant directions for these routes. However, they can be
driven in both directions.
Route I is a good alternative for travellers if the main delay takes place on the motorway
between Delft and The Hague (“Den Haag” on ﬁgure 1a). It uses an alternative motorway, the
A4 motorway at the west side of Delft (route I). Traﬃc can return to the original route by a
connecting highway just south of Delft. This is a short detour of 6 km. Coming from the north,
the A4 motorway entrance is convenient, namely continue on the A4. In fact, to turn to the A13,
one has to take the exit. The location of this junction is indicated by an “A” in ﬁgure 1a.
For larger queues there is a detour completely avoiding the A13 between Delft and The
Hague. This is only possibile for people wanting to go from Rotterdam or origins more south
towards destinations which are as north as The Hague or more north (see ﬁgure 1a), or the other
direction. However, traﬃc does not pass towns in between, such as for instance Delft and is
therefore unsuitable for traﬃc with these destinations. The alternative route is here described
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for traﬃc coming from the south at the eastern part of the ring road around Rotterdam. When
reaching the northern branch of the ring road of Rotterdam (at the point marked with a “B” in
the map), traﬃc can divide from the original route, the A20 westbound towards the A13, and
take the A20 eastbound and then travel westbound on the A12 instead. It is not possible to turn
directly from the A20 to the A12 westbound at the motorway intersection. Therefore, traﬃc has
to cross on a non-motorway to the A12, which is possible at “C1” (route II in table 1) or “C2”
(route III). The route turning at C2 is the quicker of the two, but has a larger detour compared to
the main route (7 km) including 3 kilometers on non-motorways.
Smaller disruptions will not make people change their route towards route II or III. These
routes are namely more congestion prone than alternative I in peak hours, which means there
is an extra risk on delays. Furthermore, the point at which travellers need to take that route
decision is further upstream, which means that they will take route II or III only if the traﬃc
conditions on the originally intended route are really bad. For smaller disruptions route I is a
sensible alternative.
Both at the northbound decision point (for accident 1 and 2, “A” in ﬁgure 1a) and at the
southbound decision point (accidents 3 to 5, “B” on ﬁgure 1a) a variable message sign (VMS) is
present which could suggest an alternative route. It was not possible to ﬁnd the messages shown
at the VMS, which might include a route advice, which are at best based on instantaneous travel
times are communicated.
3.2. Data selection
For this study we use incident data from December 2007 to September 2008. The database
of incidents mentions the location of the incident, the moment it happens, as well as the time
the emergency vehicles leave the incident location. From the database we select incidents on the
A13 motorway if there are wrecks or emergency workers at the roadway on working days and if
there is a signiﬁcant queue. The last requirement means that most of the considered incidents are
within the peak period.
All motorways within the study area are equipped with double loop detectors every 500
meters. To analyse the route choice, ﬂow data obtained from these double loops is used. At
the detectors, speeds and counts are recorded and then aggregated over one minute. These one-
minute data are stored and can be accessed for each detector individually.
Unfortunately, it was impossible to track back if route advice messages were given to the
drivers by Variable Message Signs or radio broadcasted traﬃc information. On the radio mes-
sages in the Netherlands usually the reason of the delay is given, so it is likely that travellers are
informed in case the road is completely closed.
3.3. Indicators for route choice change
To ﬁnd the amount of traﬃc that reacts on these ﬂows, several indicators are computed which
are introduced in this section. The ﬁrst step to get insight in the route choice process is computing
the split fractions (i.e., the quotient of the ﬂow to the main direction and the total ﬂow) at the
decision points. By using split fractions rather than ﬂows, we remove the eﬀect of ﬂuctuating
demand. Also, if the congestion spills back onto the link where the decision has to be made,
the ﬂow on that particular link is reduced and traﬃc to both directions is hindered. Only for a
few minutes there will be a queue on some lanes of a multilane motorway. Although there can
be temporarily an eﬀect that one lane to the alternative route is not congested. This situation,
however, will not exist very long since congestion grow further upstream and block drivers in
V.L. Knoop et al. / Procedia Engineering 3 (2010) 113–128 117
Knoop et al. / Procedia Engineering 00 (2010) 1–16 6
both directions. This means that traﬃc in both directions is equally inﬂuenced and the split
fraction remains the same.
Mathematically, the split fractions can be expressed as follows:
S =
qmain
qtotal
(1)
in which qmain is the ﬂow to the normal route (fastest in non-incident conditions) and qtotal is
the ﬂow to the junction, i.e. the sum of the ﬂow of the alternative route and the normal route.
S is the split fraction as function of time, which will be calculated for the day of the accident
and for several reference days. We now compare the split fractions for the incident day with the
other days, both at the same time of the day. Thus, we have one value for the split fraction at the
accident day, and one for each of the reference days. Using a t-test it is tested whether S on the
accident day diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the values in the reference days. This is repeated for each
time interval and this will show in in which time interval S diﬀers.
This split fraction qualitatively show weather people change their routes. However, the diﬀer-
ence of the two split fractions will not tell which fraction of the travellers actually take another
route. We will assume that the change in split fraction comes only from people that in nor-
mal conditions would travel to the main direction. The amount of people changing routes is
S normal − S acc in which S normal is the split fraction in normal, non-incident, conditions, and S acc
is the split fraction during the accident. This can be devided by the number of people travelling
towards the incident in normal conditions (the only ones who might consider taking an alterative
route) Then, the amount of people rerouting relative to the number who might reroute can now
be expressed by:
R =
S normal − S acc
S normal
= 1 − S
acc
S normal
(2)
The changes in route choice will be analysed in combination with diﬀerences in instantaneous
queue length and instantaneous travel time between the main route and the alternative routes. To
this end, loop detector is collected. For routes II and III, the queue length and the travel times
can be constructed. Only a part of route I is equipped with loop detectors, so the speeds are
unknown. However, from experience it is known that the part of route I which is not equipped
with detectors is usually not very congested.
The road is split up into sections in such a way that the detectors are exactly halfway each
section with a length of approximately 500 meters each. It is assumed that the average speed is
constant over the section and that that speed equals the average speed on the detector. A section
is assumed to be congested if the average speed is below 70 km/h. This threshold speed is chosen
for all roads since it marks the speed where traﬃc changes from smoothly ﬂowing to a traﬃc state
where drivers need to be active in their driving. There are more accelerations and decelerations,
and for cars with a manual gearbox it is required to change gears.
By summing the lengths of the congested sections, the (instantaneous) queue length is con-
structed. We will compare the queue length to the fraction of travellers that take another route.
We choose for the instantaneous queue length, rather than the travel time that will be experienced
by the travellers since this is the information that is given to the road users by VMS signs, or ra-
dio broadcast. We also construct the instantaneous travel times based on the section distances
and average speeds measured by the detectors, since this is the best information that VMS signs
might give.
There are many factors inﬂuencing the route choice. One of them is the weather which can
inﬂuence the number of trips for speciﬁc origins and destinations. The number of trips can also
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depend on the day of the week. Obviously, a diﬀerent number of trips on several OD-pairs
can inﬂuence the split fractions. Therefore, as reference for the split fractions, we use the split
fractions on the same day of the week on days with comparable weather conditions.
The route choice are ﬁrst analysed as function of time. A t-test is used to test diﬀerences in
split fraction at the same time between the day with an accident and comparable days. However,
this will not reveal whether people change their route due to an incident directly or due to the
queues caused by the accident. We also analyse this. We compare the route choice for similar
queue lengths on days with an accident and without. If for the same queue length diﬀerence
(or travel time diﬀerence) the route choices diﬀer, travellers do not only react on the congestion,
but also on the occurrence of the accident itself. To analyse this, we will make a scatter plot
of the split fraction and the queue length. Similarly, a scatter plot of the split fraction and the
instantaneous travel time will show whether people react only on travel time diﬀerences or also
on the fact that an accident has occurred.
All measured data is one-minute aggregated data which ﬂuctuates much. In order to see a
trend in the graphical representations, we smoothed the data using a moving average ﬁlter. In
particular, the ﬁlter replaces each data point with a weighted average of which the weight factor
depends on the distance to the considered time step. Data which is collected at times which diﬀer
more than 15 minutes from the considered time is not considered at all and therefore get a weight
factor of 0.
4. Incident description
This section describes ﬁve incidents which meet the criteria posed in section 3. Table 2 in
the conclusions section shows the results of the study, but also shows an overview of the main
characteristics of the accidents.
The ﬁrst incident is a car accident which took place at Monday 23 June 2008 at 13h15 and
lasted until 16h45, blocking one lane of the A13 southbound during the afternoon peak hour.
It was a clear day, so as comparison we use 9, 16 and 30 June 2008, all Mondays with clear
weather. The accident caused extra congestion during the peak hour on the A13 southbound.
The resulting traﬃc conditions are depicted in ﬁgure 1b.
The second incident is similar to the ﬁrst incident. At Friday 22 August 2008 a car crashed
at around 16.50 hours during the afternoon peak hour. The location of the incident is marked
with a 2 on the map in ﬁgure 1a. Also in this case, traﬃc at the A13 southbound was delayed
during the afternoon peak hour. The resulting traﬃc conditions are shown in ﬁgure 1c. The traﬃc
conditions on this rainy Friday are compared with other Fridays with similar amounts of rain.
The length of the jams does not exceed several kilometers in either of the two incident cases.
Since the road is not completely blocked, we expect people not to take detour II or III (as ex-
plained in section 3.1). For both these incidents we therefore consider the amount of traﬃc taking
alternative route I.
Accidents 3 to 5 cause a larger disruption of the traﬃc ﬂow for traﬃc and happen in the north-
bound direction. The third incident takes place at 12 December 2007 at the A13 in northbound
direction. At the accident location, indicated with a 3 on the map in ﬁgure 1a, two out of the three
lanes are closed in the morning peak from 6.25 am to 8.05 am. This resulted in long queues: 5
km on the A13 and then a spillback queue on the A20 westbound of more than 7.5 km, which
means that it spills back further than the motorway junction indicated with a “B” in ﬁgure 1a.
The resulting traﬃc jams are depicted in ﬁgure 1d. The weather was clear at 12 December 2007,
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(a) The case study area with the incident locations (num-
bers) and points for route decisions (letters)
(b) 23 June 2008 at 16.00 hours (accident 1)
(c) 22 August 2008 at 15.45 hours (accident 2) (d) 12 December 2007 at 7.30 hours (accident 3)
Accident
Queue
a
b
c
(e) 22 February 2008 at 7.30 hours (accident 4) – accident b
and c happened later in the morning peak
(f) 22 September 2008 at 13.30 hours (accident 5)
Figure 1: The studied area and the traﬃc situations in each of the incident cases
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the temperature was a few degrees Celsius and there was no precipitation. The Wednesdays be-
tween 19 December and Wednesday 2 January were not considered to give good reference on the
normal traﬃc state because many people in the Netherlands might take oﬀ around Christmas and
New Year. Therefore, other days in November and January are taken as reference (not in early
December because the weather was diﬀerent).
At the fourth day we consider, Friday 22 February 2008, an incident happened at the begin-
ning of the morning peak hour at around 6.30 hours in the northbound direction at the location
indicated with a 4 in ﬁgure 1a. Later a second incident happened in the southbound direction at
about the same position. When the accident was removed at around 8.45 hours in the morning, a
new accident happened in the northbound direction at the position indicated with a 5 in ﬁgure 1a.
In spite of both accidents, the road was never completely closed; however, the northbound traﬃc
was seriously hindered by the congestion. The traﬃc situation at 7.30 hours in the morning is
shown in ﬁgure 1e. The weather at 22 February 2008 was cloudy with some rain and therefore
also cloudy and rainy Fridays are used as reference.
The ﬁfth situation we analyse is an incident happening at the A13 in northbound direction
(see “5” in ﬁgure 1a). In the tail of the queue, a second, larger, incident took place. To have
enough safety during the emergency work, the police closed down the road completely. The
results are long queues in northbound direction, spilling back on the A20 and even on the A16,
as depicted in ﬁgure 1f. The incident took place at Monday 22 September 2008. As reference
we take other sunny Mondays in September and October.
For case 3 to 5, the traﬃc volume taking detour I is not analysed, since the main delay takes
place south of the part for which route I provides an alternative (see section 3.1). Therefore, we
only analyse the use of the alternative routes II and III during this incident for travellers coming
from the south (“D” in ﬁgure 1a).
For accident 4 and 5, the larger accidents, historical news messages could be found traced
on a Dutch website (nu.nl). In both cases it was stated that traﬃc had been advised to take the
alternative route II or III. That route advice could lead to an increased part of the travellers taking
an alternative route.
5. Observed route choice changes
This section presents the actual change in route choice which come out of the data analysis.
For one accident (accident 4) all results are presented in section 5.1. After analysing these results
for all accidents, we found a distinction between the drivers’ behaviour after minor accidents and
major accidents. Therefore, these are described separately in sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
Section 5.4 discusses the diﬀerences and the generalisability of the outcomes.
5.1. Analysis outcomes
For all ﬁve accidents the same analysis is carried out. Figure 2 shows the result for accident
4, which is taken as example to explain the analysis. Note that a full description of the results is
presented in chapter 5 of the thesis of Knoop [12]. Figure 2a shows the split fraction S (equation
1). For accident 1 and 2, the split fraction at point A is analysed. For accidents 3 to 5, the traﬃc
to alternative routes II and III is considered and therefore the decision at point B is analysed.
Figure 2b shows the fraction of traﬃc that takes another route R (equation 2). The expample also
clariﬁes the diﬀerence between the two measures. Instead of approximately 50% of the traﬃc,
only 20% of the traﬃc heads towards the incident. That means that 60% of the original 50%
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Figure 2: The resulting route choice for accident 4
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(being 30 base points) changes its route. Therefore, the line in ﬁgure 2b raises to around 60%.
This is considered the most interesting measure and will be shown for all other accidents as well.
Figure 2c and d show the queue length diﬀerence and the travel time diﬀerence respectively
as function of the time of the day. The patterns seen here are typical: a queue forms after the
accident happens, builds up, then decreases and ﬁnally dissolves.
Figure 2e and f plot the split fraction versus the diﬀerence in queue length and travel time
respectively. These ﬁgures show how sensitive travellers are in their route choice. It shows
weather they react diﬀerently on the same queue length (travel time) diﬀerences in case there is
an accident an in normal situations.
5.2. Minor incidents
Minor incidents are accident 1 and 2. The lines in ﬁgure 3a and b show that that the split
fraction at the day of the incident does not diﬀer compared to the route choice on other the other
days: the fraction of travellers changing route is close to zero. A t-test shows that there is indeed
no diﬀerence.
In accident 1 and 2, more or less the same phenomena are observed. Although there is an
incident, the delays are minor compared to the normal congestion: for some of the reference days,
the congestion is even (much) more. The normal congestion, however, is is caused downstream,
on the Rotterdam ring road. At the days of an accident, the congestion already starts a bit more
upstream and then there is a part free ﬂow driving, south of the point where alternative route I
joins the main route. The ﬁrst part of the queue could be avoided by taking route I. For both
cases it holds that in total, it would be several minutes shorter to change routes. However, no
changes in route choice are observed.
5.3. Major incidents
For accident 3 to 5, we analyse the split faction at point B, indicating how much traﬃc will
deviate to routes II and III. For accident 3 the split fraction changes considerably, as shown in
ﬁgure 3c. This shows that between 7h30 and 8h45 the traﬃc arriving at the motorway junction
takes an alternative route. A t-test shows that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value
< 0.01) between 7h25 and 8h10. The ﬁgure shows that up to 30% changes their route. The
instantaneous travel time for the alternative route is over 30 minutes shorter. Although the extra
ﬂow to the alternative route causes congestion of several kilometers on route II/III, this is not
as bad as the extra congestion on the normal route. In fact, a larger fraction of travellers take
an alternative if the queue length is considered as explanatory factor, which could indicate that
the accident itself, rather than the queue length causes the rerouting. However, the resulting
route choice is line with normal behaviour if travel time diﬀerences between the two routes are
considered to be the explanatory factor.
Accident 4 shows traﬃc situation similar to accident 3. The split fraction to the original route
reduces strongly as can be seen in ﬁgure 2a. The fraction of people switching routes, computed
by equation 2, is shown in ﬁgure 2b. This percentage increases up to values above 50%. The
queue length on the main route is up to 12 kilometers in length, whereas the queue length on the
alternative route never exceeds several kilometers; the queue length diﬀerence is plotted in ﬁgure
2c. Alternative route III is up to 45 minutes shorter, whereas in normal conditions they have the
same travel time (ﬁgure 2d). Figure 2e shows that there are longer queue lengths at the normal
route and less travellers taking the normal route.
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Figure 2 shows that the travellers will not deviate immediately after the incident has hap-
pened. Also, they will not change back to the original route once the incident has been cleared.
This delayed reaction causes a hysteresis loop in ﬁgure 2f.
For accident 5 the split fraction diﬀers considerably, as depicted in ﬁgure 3d. From the tra-
vellers normally taking the A13, 40% takes another route. This fraction is less then for accident
4, although the main road now is blocked. From 13.00 hours to 15.00 hours there is a signiﬁcantly
higher fraction of travellers turning towards the route II and II, although the incident itself has
been cleared at 14.20h hours.
The extra volume to the A20 east is around 1000 vehicles per hour. This extra volume is
supported at the motorway, but not at the underlying roads at the connection points C1 and C2
(see ﬁgure 1a and 1f). Therefore, extra congestion sets in on the motorway just upstream of
C1, the oﬀ ramp to the road connecting both motorways of the alternative route. This extra
congestion is around 7 kilometers. This can be an explanation why the fraction of travellers
choosing another route is lower than at accident 4. It is furthermore interesting to note (see
ﬁgure 4a) that at the end of the incident, the queue on the main route decreases rapidly, whereas
the queue on the alternative route takes longer to solve since it also includes a secondary road
with a low capacity. Therefore, shortly after the incident has been cleared, the congestion on the
alternative route is longer than on the main route. The travel time diﬀerences ﬂuctuate similarly.
During the incident the alternative route is up to 30 minutes quicker. However, after the incident
has been cleared, the travel time on the alternative route is around 15 minutes longer than on the
main route. An explanation for the fact that the alternative route is more congested than the main
route where the incident took place could be that people still did not get an update of the travel
advice to take an alternative route.
Figure 4b shows clearly that the incident is an extra incentive for drivers to take an alternative
route. For the same queue length diﬀerence or travel time diﬀerence, a larger percentage than
normal takes an alternative route. The queue length then reduces quickly. In the diagram this
means that ﬁrst there is a queue length diﬀerence (points moving to the right), then the travellers
change their route choice (points moving down). Then, the queue length diﬀerence reduces
(points moving left), but the travellers do not adapt their route choice again and they will not
switch back to a normal route choice. Hence, the points stay low in the diagram. This hysteresis
causes a clockwise movement in the ﬁgure. The reaction of drivers to change back to the original
route is made later, once the queue on the alternative route is longer than on the route with the
accident. This means that ﬁrst the points in ﬁgure 4b move further left and then they move up
again. Then the traﬃc normalises and the traﬃc conditions return where they started, and the
circle is closed.
5.4. Discussion: similarities, diﬀerences and generalisability
Table 2 summarises the results. It shows a clear diﬀerence in route choice between accidents
1 and 2 at one hand and accidents 3 to 5 at the other hand. In the ﬁrst two cases the queue is
shorter, but still the alternative route is shorter than the original, congested route. The nature of
accidents 3 to 5 is diﬀerent. Those accidents reduce the capacity considerably; for accident 5 the
road is even blocked completely. This means that the traﬃc is moving very slowly over more
than 10 km. One of the reasons for traﬃc to deviate from their intended route could therefore be
the length of the queue they are facing. If it is long, then the travellers will change their route,
but when the queue is not longer than several kilometers, they will not change routes even if the
alternative route has become slightly quicker than the original.
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Figure 4: The drivers’ reaction in accident 5
Table 2: The incidents used in this study
Nr. Direction Date From To Complete Extra delay Percentage
blocking changing
route
1 South 23 Jun 2008 13h15 16h45 no Minor 0
2 South 22 Aug 2008 16h50 18h45 no Minor 0
3 North 12 Dec 2007 6h25 8h05 no Major 30%
4 North 22 Feb 2008 6h20 9h00 no Major >50%
5 North 22 Sep 2008 12h35 14h20 yes Major 40%
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For accident 5 a hysteresis loop is seen (ﬁgure 4b) and explained in section 5.3. The same
hysteresis loop is seen for accident 4 (ﬁgure 2e) and also at accident 3. A reason why the lines are
not smooth is that travel updates come at discrete intervals in time (radio messages for instance).
We suppose that travellers start taking an alternative route once it becomes clear there is a serious
accident, and then are risk-averse in their route choice. This reasoning is in line with the fact that
drivers do not change their routes when there is just a minor incident. This risk-averse route
choice behaviour is for instance also shown in Bogers et al [13]. A route passed an accident
location has a less certain travel time than an alternative route, because it is unclear what is the
capacity at the accident location. Even once the queue length is known, the delay can still be
varying.
A similar reasoning can be followed for evacuations. As long as traﬃc is not very congested,
people will travel their normal route, since that is familiar to them. However, once heavy con-
gestion sets in, travelers will understand that the situation is considerably diﬀerent and they will
reroute to a route that is shorter, or more reliable as long as they succeed of getting out of the
aﬀected area in time.
This reasoning might be diﬀerent if very accurate predictions of the traﬃc situation – in terms
of travel time – are given to the drivers, and if this information is perceived to be correct. In that
case, they might trust that information and take the advised route.
6. Conclusions and future work
The research shows how travellers change their route if the intended route is blocked due to
an incident. Hereto, the actual route choice behaviour is studied for ﬁve incident cases. It is found
that the severity of the capacity reduction incident and therefore the severity of the delays play an
important role in the decision to deviate from the intended route. A considerable percentage of
the travellers will take an alternative route when faced exceptional conditions on their intended
route, even causing congestion on the alternative route. It is likely that in large calamities, like
an evacuation, this fraction will be at least the fraction of rerouting traﬃc during a large incident.
The percentage found changing their routes could be more than 50%. Knoop et al showed
earlier [1] the consequence of this ﬁnding. It means that that the internal congestion due to
spillback of traﬃc jams, or even grid lock eﬀects, play a minor role during evacuation.
The study presented here showed a rerouting percentage of 50%, even though it is not yet
the last possibility to get oﬀ the motorway. This means that traﬃc which is assumed to take the
original route still has possibilities to avoid the queues by taking another alternative route. Also,
traﬃc having a destination before (i.e. upstream of) the bottleneck is now included in the volume
of traﬃc that might consider to change their route. Both these eﬀects mean that the fraction that
changes its route during an incident as found in this study is a lower bound for this value. If it
were possible to track the individual vehicles over two diﬀerent routes, there would have been no
need to make the assumption that all traﬃc needs to pass the bottleneck. This could be achieved
for instance by data from licence plate cameras or track vehicles by GSM signal. One would
expect that in that case the fraction of deviating traﬃc is even higher than the values found here.
This could be an interesting approach for the future, but that requires a diﬀerent type of data
which was not (yet) widely available at the time of this research.
It is also found that travellers actually avoid a route passing an incident location. The split
fractions towards the normal route is lower in case of an incident compared to a situation with
the same travel time diﬀerence but without an incident. Finally, it is shown that travellers have a
delayed reaction on the traﬃc situation.
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This delayed reaction can be due to the delayed information on which they react. It would
be therefore be interesting to analyze the amount of information that is given to the drivers. For
instance, Dynamic Route Information Panels could be used to provide information. In addition,
nowadays, more and more information about the traﬃc state is presented in-car using a navi-
gation device with Traﬃc Message Channnel (TMC) options or – in the Netherlands – a “Live
Traﬃc” function which gives information on the traﬃc speeds in the network based on the speeds
of other cars equipped with the same navigation devices. In this study it was impossible to track
back which information was communicated to the drivers, and at which moment. This would be
a valuable addition for future research. Moreover, it would be interesting to see how the values
of traﬃc adapting their route change over time as the penetration rate of dynamic navigation
systems increases. These new techniques could in the future also be used to analyse the route
choice during evacuations.
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